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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the practice of shackling an incarcerated pregnant
female is consistently condemned by both national and international
public opinion as well as leading medical and public health
associations, it remains routine practice in the majority of prisons and
jails throughout the United States. Further, although some states have
recently adopted legislation banning such practices, the swarm of
litigation surrounding the issue of shackling in those states illustrates
that this treatment is still occurring despite the extraordinary efforts of
advocates and laws banning the practice. This paper begins by
discussing the origins of shackling in order to provide a framework,
and then presents two individual accounts before offering information
detailing the serious health risks that shackling imposes upon female
inmates and their babies. This paper then dives into analyses of the
strong legal challenges against the barbaric practice, outlining
shackling’s clear violations of both constitutional and international
human rights laws. Finally, this paper notes the significant progress
achieved thus far and what needs to be done to achieve complete
abandonment of the grossly inhumane practice.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF SHACKLING

The origins of shackling can be traced back numerous
centuries, with the earliest restraint relics dating back to prehistoric
times, and the earliest references appearing numerous times in the
Bible. However, it remains unclear exactly when United States
detention centers began employing the practice of shackling pregnant
inmates. Historians generally cite the 1970s and 1980s as the time
period when the practice likely became common, as it was during
these decades that criminal justice facilities adopted gender-neutral
policies in response to the civil rights and women's rights movements.1
Thus, those policies resulted in the shackling of most prisoners –
regardless of gender and condition – who were involved in any
transport outside of the detention facility.
At the time that gender-neutral criminal justice policies were
adopted, women were underrepresented at all levels of the criminal
justice system. “Little or no thought was given to the possibility of a

1

Colleen Mastony, Childbirth in Chains, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2010.
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female prisoner until she appeared at the door of the institution. It was
as though crime and punishment existed in a world in which gender
equaled male.”2 Consequently, prison infrastructures and policies
were established to handle the prototypical violent male offender, and
shackling, specifically, was employed for the purposes of decreasing
flight risk and maintaining the safety of the officers and public against
the prototypical violent male offender.3
III.

TODAY'S SHACKLING EPIDEMIC UPON PREGNANT FEMALE
INMATES – HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?

The prison and jail populations in the United States have vastly
diversified since the adoption of gender-neutral policies. Within the
last quarter century, the number of women involved in the United
States’ criminal justice system has skyrocketed. In fact, United States’
prisons and jails now house approximately two hundred thousand
women.4 Since 1980, the number of women in prison has increased at
nearly double the rate for men, and more than fifty percent of female
inmates are under the age of thirty-five.5 Thus, it comes as no surprise
that the fastest growing prison population in the country consists of
mothers of young children.6 Further, four percent of women in state
prisons, three percent of women in federal prisons, and approximately
five percent of women in jail reported being pregnant at the time of
their incarceration.7 Accordingly, it is estimated that nearly two
thousand babies are born to women in prison or jail annually,8 and due
to the continual increase in female inmates, this figure is on the rise.

2

MARC MAUER & MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, eds., INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 181 (2002).
3
Mastony, supra note 1.
4
TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011 –
STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2012), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf.
5
B. JAYE ANNO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: GUIDELINES
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AN ADEQUATE DELIVERY SYSTEM 233 (2001), available
at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2001/017521.pdf.
6
RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE
POLITICS IN AMERICA 243 (2005).
7
LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF JAIL INMATES (2006), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpji.pdf.
8
Ronald L. Braithwaite, Henrie M. Treadwell & Kimberly R.J. Arriola, Health
Disparities and Incarcerated Women: A Population Ignored, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1679 (2005).
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The drastic increase in the number of female inmates has been
largely attributed to the past quarter-century’s “war on drugs” and the
implementation of mandatory drug sentencing policies.9 Stephanie R.
Bush-Baskette, a former member of the New Jersey State Legislature
and renowned researcher and author of women’s imprisonment issues,
explained in a recent publication, “Inadvertently, the war on drugs
became the war on women….”10 Between the years of 1986 and 1996,
the number of women incarcerated for drug offenses increased by an
astonishing 888 percent.11 Thus, the United States’ prisons and jails,
which were designed to house violent male offenders, are now home to
growing numbers of non-violent female offenders, a situation that the
original framers of penological policy never anticipated.
Despite the extreme number of women entering the United
States’ criminal justice system, female offenders are much less likely
to be incarcerated due to violent crimes. In fact, women only account
for approximately fourteen percent of all violent offenses.12 Further,
even when females are convicted of violent crimes, simple assault
accounts for nearly seventy-five percent of those convictions.13 This
illustrates that even when women are accountable for violent crime,
the majority are classified on the lowest end of the violence spectrum,
as opposed to violent crimes committed by men.
As illustrated above, today’s prison and jail population in the
United States has vastly diversified since the adoption of genderneutral policies. Unfortunately, changes in criminal justice policy
have failed to keep pace with these changes. Thus, shackling remains
in practice, and is, unfortunately, being imposed upon pregnant female
inmates at alarming rates. The following accounts of two former
inmates detail the gruesome experiences that shocking numbers of
pregnant female inmates have experienced and are continuing to
experience.

9

LENORA LAPIDUS, ET AL, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CAUGHT IN THE NET: THE
IMPACT ON DRUG POLICIES ON WOMEN AND FAMILIES 15-16 (2005), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file431_23513.pdf.
10
Stephanie R. Bush-Baskette, The “War on Drugs”: A War Against Women?, in
HARSH PUNISHMENT: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN’S IMPRISONMENT
211, 216-17 (Sandy Cook & Susanne Davids, eds. 1999).
11
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GENDER-RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE,
AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WOMEN OFFENDERS 74 (2002), available at
nicic.gov/library/files/018017.pdf.
12
LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN
OFFENDERS 1 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf.
13
Id.
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A CASE TOO CLOSE TO HOME

Juana Villegas was nine months pregnant when she was
driving home from a doctor’s appointment with her eleven-year-old
son, fourteen-year-old son, and two-year-old daughter on July 3,
2008.14 While travelling through the City of Berry Hill in the greater
Nashville, Tennessee area, Ms. Villegas was stopped by Officer Tim
Coleman.15 Without notifying Ms. Villegas of why she had been
stopped, Officer Coleman asked for Ms. Villegas’ license and
registration.16 Ms. Villegas failed to produce a valid driver’s license,
and Officer Coleman instructed Ms. Villegas to call someone with a
valid driver’s license to retrieve her children and vehicle, and
immediately placed her under arrest.17 Despite Ms. Villegas’
condition and the presence of her children, Officer Coleman ordered
Ms. Villegas to get into his patrol car under the threat of cuffing her,
and transported her to a Davidson County pretrial detention center.18
Ms. Villegas went into labor while alone in a cell in the
detention center on the evening of July 5, 2008.19 After complaining
of severe pain from contractions and pleading with the guard on duty,
Ms. Villegas was taken to the nurse’s station, where her hands and feet
were shackled in anticipation of transport.20 Ms. Villegas was then
transported by ambulance to Nashville General Hospital, where she
remained shackled.21 Despite medical staff requests, Ms. Villegas was
forced to change into a hospital gown in the presence of two male
officers.22 The officers refused to allow Ms. Villegas any privacy
while changing or during examinations, and prohibited Ms. Villegas
from contacting her husband to notify him of the impending birth of
their son.23 Throughout the entirety of the labor process, Ms. Villegas’
left foot and right hand were shackled to the hospital bed.24 Despite
complaints of the hospital staff that such treatment was barbaric and

14

Complaint at ¶ 7, Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Davidson Cnty., 789 F. Supp. 2d 895
(M.D. Tenn. 2011) (No. 09CV00219).
15
Id. at ¶ 8.
16
Id. at ¶ 11.
17
Id. at ¶ 13.
18
Id. at ¶ 24.
19
Id. at ¶ 43.
20
Id.
21
Id. at ¶ 44.
22
Id. at ¶ 45.
23
Id. at ¶ 46.
24
Id. at ¶ 47.
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dangerous to Ms. Villegas and her child, Ms. Villegas remained
shackled.25
Ms. Villegas gave birth to her son during the early hours of
July 6, 2008.26 Ms. Villegas was instructed by nurses to walk around
as much as possible post-delivery in order to encourage muscle
rehabilitation.27 However, Ms. Villegas was prohibited from doing so
as her feet remained shackled throughout the entirety of her two-day
post-partum recovery period, even while bathing and using the toilet.28
Further, Ms. Villegas was immediately separated from her newborn
son.29
A nurse had provided Ms. Villegas with a breast pump and
moisturizers to enable her to express her breast milk safely and to
alleviate pain while she was unable to nurse due to the separation from
her newborn.30 However, the officer accompanying Ms. Villegas
during transport refused to allow Ms. Villegas to take the materials
with her despite pleas and medical explanations of the hospital staff.31
As a result, Ms. Villegas’ breasts became extremely swollen and
painful, preventing her from moving or sleeping.32 Eventually, Ms.
Villegas developed mastitis, an infection of the breast tissue caused by
the inability to express breast milk.33 Further, because Ms. Villegas
was prohibited from properly exercising her lower body muscles postdelivery as instructed due to her shackles, Ms. Villegas experienced
weeks of cramping, stiffness, and leg pain so severe that she could not
straighten her left leg, which had been shackled to the hospital bed.34
Ms. Villegas was not reunited with her newborn son until her
release from the detention center.35 Subsequent to her release, Ms.
Villegas went to municipal court to challenge the basis for the stop in
her case.36 Ultimately, the charge upon which she was stopped was
dismissed.37 The municipal court ignored the shackling of Ms.
Villegas, noting that it was acceptable because it was implemented
pursuant to Davidson County Sherriff’s Office policy despite the fact

25

Id. at ¶ 48.
Id. at ¶ 51.
27
Id. at ¶ 53.
28
Id. at ¶¶ 53-55.
29
Id. at ¶ 59.
30
Id. at ¶ 62.
31
Id.
32
Id. at ¶ 66.
33
Id.
34
Id. at ¶ 67.
35
Id. at ¶ 68.
36
Id. at ¶ 73.
37
Id.
26
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that Ms. Villegas had not had any outstanding criminal charges, arrests
or warrants, was never violent or uncooperative, and posed no flight
risk before delivery due to the advanced stage or her pregnancy, or
after delivery due to her condition.38
V.

SHAWANNA NELSON'S NIGHTMARE

On June 3, 2003, Shawanna Nelson was placed in an Arkansas
Department of Correction detention facility following convictions for
credit fraud and writing checks with insufficient funds.39 At the time
of Ms. Nelson’s entrance into the Arkansas Department of Correction,
she was six months pregnant with her second child. On September 20,
2003, Ms. Nelson went into labor at the detention facility, and was
sent to the prison infirmary after complaining of severe pain to a
corrections officer.40 Despite having contractions recurring at six to
seven minute intervals, the infirmary nurse sent Ms. Nelson back to
her cell.41 Ms. Nelson returned to the infirmary shortly thereafter,
barely able to walk down the hall due to the intense pain, but was
again sent back to her cell as her contractions intensified to five to six
minute intervals.42 Ultimately, after witnessing the severity of the
situation and the lack of the infirmary staff’s concern, the correctional
officer demanded that Ms. Nelson be taken to a hospital and took
action herself.43
Correctional Officer Patricia Turensky escorted Ms. Nelson to
the hospital.44 Although Officer Turensky stated that she never felt
threatened by Ms. Nelson at any time, and that Ms. Nelson neither said
nor did anything to suggest she posed a flight risk, Officer Turensky
shackled Ms. Nelson’s legs to a wheelchair upon arrival at the
hospital.45 Upon arriving in the maternity ward, Ms. Nelson changed
into a hospital gown and was placed on a stretcher.46 At this point,
Ms. Nelson was in the very final stages of labor, as her cervix had
dilated to seven centimeters.47
Nonetheless, Officer Turensky

38

Id. at ¶ 38.
Elizabeth Alexander, Unshackling Shawanna: The Battle over Chaining Women
Prisoners During Labor and Delivery, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 435, 441
(2010).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir. 2009).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 526.
39
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shackled both of Ms. Nelson’s ankles to opposite ends of the hospital
bed.48
Due to the shackles on both of her ankles, Ms. Nelson was
unable to move her legs, stretch, or change positions to alleviate the
extreme pain.49 Medical staff pleaded with Officer Turensky to
remove Ms. Nelson’s restraints, but to no avail.50 Further, because it
was too close to delivery for the administration of an epidural, Ms.
Nelson was only given only Tylenol.51 Ms. Nelson gave birth to a
nearly ten-pound baby boy on September 20, 2003 at 6:23 in the
evening.52
As a direct result of being shackled, Ms. Nelson suffered a hip
dislocation, torn stomach muscles, and an umbilical hernia during
labor and delivery.53 During the first night of her post-partum
recovery in the hospital, Ms. Nelson was prevented from accessing the
restroom without first being unshackled from her hospital bed. By the
time the accompanying officer responded to Ms. Nelson’s pleas and
unlocked the shackles, Ms. Nelson had been forced to soil herself.54
Following Ms. Nelson’s release from the hospital and
correctional facility, she underwent major surgeries for both the hip
dislocation and umbilical hernia she suffered due to shackling during
labor and delivery.55 Ms. Nelson’s hip injury ultimately caused
permanent deformities to her hips, resulting in permanent inabilities to
sleep or bear weight on her left side, or to sit or stand for extended
periods of time.56 Additionally, Ms. Nelson was advised to never have
any more children due to the permanent damage that shackling
imposed on her physical health.57
VI.

HEALTH IMPLICATIONS

Leading medical experts throughout the United States and the
entire world have voiced their clear opposition to the practice of
shackling pregnant inmates. The American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, the American Medical Association, and various

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Alexander, supra note 39, at 442.
55
Id. at 443.
56
Nelson, 583 F.3d at 526.
57
Id.
49
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other experts in fields concerning fetal and maternal health have
expressed their deep concerns regarding the dangers that shackling
poses to the physical health of both the mother and child, as well as the
mental health of the mother.
A. Shackling Imposes an Unacceptable Risk to the
Physical Health of both the Mother and Child
The use of shackles on pregnant female inmates poses
substantial risks to the physical health of both the mother and child.
First, physical restraints interfere with the ability of health care
providers to safely perform necessary actions. Shackles specifically
inhibit a practitioner from adequately assessing and evaluating the
health of the mother and fetus, assisting the mother during labor and
delivery, and conducting emergency procedures if necessary.58 Dr.
Patricia Garcia, an obstetrician and gynecologist at Northwestern
University’s Prentice Women’s Hospital, explained, “Having the
woman in shackles compromises the ability to manipulate her legs into
the proper positions for necessary treatment.”59 Numerous imperative
assessments are inhibited by the presence of shackles. For example,
tests for conditions such as appendicitis, preterm labor, vaginal
bleeding, venous thrombosis, and kidney infection all cannot be
performed upon a shackled patient.60 Further, hypertensive disease,
which occurs in approximately 12-22% of pregnancies, and is directly
responsible for approximately 18% of all maternal deaths in the United
States, cannot be safely treated while a woman is shackled.61
Shackles also impose a dangerous burden should complications
arise. Dr. Garcia specifically stated that “women in labor need to be
mobile so that they can assume various positions as needed and so they
can quickly be moved to an operating room” in case exigent
complications arise.62 Particular potential emergencies of concern, due

58

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, HEALTH CARE FOR
PREGNANT AND POSTPARTUM INCARCERATED WOMEN AND ADOLESCENT FEMALES,
2011 Comm. Op. No. 511, at 3 available at
http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee
_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Health_Care_for_Pregnant_and_Postpa
rtum_Incarcerated_Women_and_Adolescent_Females.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
AMNESTY INT’L, “NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE”: VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (1999), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/019/1999/en/685257e6-e33d-11dd808b-bfd8d459a3de/amr510191999en.html.
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to their common occurrences, include shoulder dystocia, hemorrhage,
fetal heart rate abnormalities, and the need for an immediate cesarean
section.63 The dangerous delays that shackling imposes in such cases
are remarkably hazardous.
Dr. Garcia explained to Amnesty
International that if the need for an emergency cesarean section were
to arise, the presence of restraints on the mother could possibly be the
difference between life and death for the mother or her child: “If there
were a need for a C-section (caesarian delivery), the mother needs to
be moved to an operating room immediately and a delay of even five
minutes could result in permanent brain damage for the baby.”64
Second, shackling hampers the mother from shifting positions
in order to alleviate the extreme pains of labor and childbirth. Such
restraint leads to increased stress and desperation, which may decrease
the amount of oxygen available to the fetus, and often results in severe
bruising, abrasions, and other injuries to the mother. Warnice
Robinson was forced to give birth while shackled in Illinois after a
conviction for shoplifting.65 Ms. Robinson described her experience
of giving birth while incarcerated as “one of the most horrifying
experiences of my life.”66 In an interview with Amnesty International,
Ms. Robinson continued, “I was shackled to a metal bed post by my
right ankle throughout seven hours of labor. Imagine being shackled
to a metal bedpost, excruciating pains going through my body, and not
being able to adjust myself to even try to feel any type of comfort,
trying to move and with each turn having hard, cold metal restraining
my movements.”67 Samantha Luther was forced to give birth in
Wisconsin while her ankles were shackled approximately eighteen
inches apart.68 Ms. Luther was required to pace in order to induce

63

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, HEALTH CARE FOR
PREGNANT AND POSTPARTUM INCARCERATED WOMEN AND ADOLESCENT FEMALES,
2011 Comm. Op. No. 511, at 3 available at
http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee
_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Health_Care_for_Pregnant_and_Postpa
rtum_Incarcerated_Women_and_Adolescent_Females.
64
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN (2001), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/custodyissues.pdf.
65
AMNESTY INT’L, “NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE”: VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (March 1999), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/019/1999/en/685257e6-e33d-11dd808b-bfd8d459a3de/amr510191999en.html.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
AMNESTY INT’L, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND
SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN (2001), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/custodyissues.pdf.
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birth while shackled, and was so tightly restrained that her shackles
were only finally removed immediately prior to birth after it was
determined that she was unable to adequately push.69 Ms. Luther
recounted that the experience was “so humiliating. My ankles were
raw.”70 Shawanna Nelson was forced to endure most of the final
stages of labor with her legs spread and cuffed to opposite sides of a
hospital gurney.71 Although her shackles were eventually removed
after numerous demands by both nurses and physicians, Ms. Nelson
suffered a permanent hip injury, torn stomach muscles, and an
umbilical hernia requiring surgical repair as a result of the shackling.72
Ms. Nelson’s injuries were so extensive that she is now unable to bear
weight on her left side, sit or stand for extended periods, and has been
advised not to have any more children.73 Ms. Nelson’s orthopedist
noted that the shackling caused permanent deformity of Ms. Nelson’s
hips.74
Third, restraints increase the risk of a life threatening injury as
a result of the mother losing her balance and falling. Pregnancy,
especially during the second and third trimesters, is notorious for
causing balance problems due to the shift of the mother’s center of
gravity.75 Falling is an extremely common occurrence in pregnant
women, and is a noted cause of miscarriage, stillbirth, and injury to
both the mother and the child. Shackling only exacerbates these
problems.76 Further, shackling not only heightens the risk of a
pregnant woman falling, but also then prevents a woman from bracing
herself during a fall in order to protect herself or her child from
injury.77
Fourth, the use of shackles after delivery prevents mothers
from effectively healing and caring for the child during the post69

Id.
Id.
71
Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 525-26 (8th Cir. 2009).
72
Id. at 526.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
See Julie B. Ehrlich & Lynn M. Paltrow, Jailing Pregnant Women Raises Health
Risks, WOMEN’S ENEWS, (Sept. 20, 2006),
http://womensenews.org/story/health/060920/jailing-pregnant-women-raises-healthrisks.
76
Id.
77
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, HEALTH CARE FOR
PREGNANT AND POSTPARTUM INCARCERATED WOMEN AND ADOLESCENT FEMALES,
2011 Comm. Op. No. 511, at 3 available at
http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee
_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Health_Care_for_Pregnant_and_Postpa
rtum_Incarcerated_Women_and_Adolescent_Females.
70
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partum recovery period. Shackling specifically hinders a woman’s
post-partum recovery. In order to begin the muscular rehabilitative
process, it is imperative for a woman to begin walking after delivery.
Such exercise is either made dangerous or is completely prohibited by
shackling. Further, as detailed by the ACLU of Georgia and American
College of Nurse Midwives, it is critical for a woman to remain
unshackled postpartum to prevent thromboembolic disease or
hemorrhaging.78 Elizabeth, a woman who was forced to give birth
while shackled in Virginia in 2006, was forced to endure all aspects of
labor, delivery, and postpartum recovery while shackled.79 Further,
she was taken back to a Virginia Correctional Center after only an
hour after delivering, and before she had expelled the placenta after
birth.80 After multiple weeks and while still incarcerated, Elizabeth
experienced a severely painful hemorrhage and finally expelled the
placenta that had remained inside of her.81
Shackling also hampers imperative mother-child bonding
practices, which are essential to the healthy development of the child.82
Dr. Patricia Garcia explained, “The use of restraints creates a
hazardous situation for the mother and the baby, compromises the
mother’s ability postpartum to care for her baby, and keeps her from
being able to breastfeed.”83 Unfortunately, the vast majority of women
who are forced to endure labor and delivery while shackled not only
remain shackled through post-partum recovery, but also either never
get to see their newborn child, or are immediately separated from
them, thus preventing any chance for mother-child bonding.84

78

AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SHACKLING OF PREGNANT INMATES: PROTECTING
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN PRISONS (2013), available at
http://www.acluga.org/issues/women-s-rights/shackling-of-pregnant-inmates/.
79
NATIONAL RELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN AGAINST TORTURE, SHACKLING STORIES FROM
INSIDE VIRGINIA’S CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, available at
http://www.nrcat.org/storage/documents/shackling%20stories_va.pdf.
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B. Shackling Imposes an Unacceptable Risk to the Mental
Health of the Mother
In addition to the extreme physical risks that are imposed upon
incarcerated mothers and their children by shackling, many women
face additional mental health issues after being forced through such a
horrific and humiliating experience. In its opposition to the practice of
shackling, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
has asserted that shackling is both unnecessary and demeaning and
causes severe mental anguish.85 Further, the ACLU has labeled
shackling as degrading, and continuously voices concerns about
shackling’s effects on not only the physical welfare, but also the
mental welfare of its victims.86
Melissa Hall, who was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance, remembers having to appear in court in leg irons, a chain
belt, and handcuffs, creating a crippling fear of falling and injuring
herself and her child.87 Further, Ms. Hall was forced to endure more
than forty-eight hours in labor while shackled with her legs spread in
stirrups while a male officer was present in her room.88 The officer
refused to remove the restraints or allow Ms. Hall any privacy, and
remained in the room watching and cheering during the NBA Finals
while the baby was crowning.89 Ms. Hall described the experience as
the worst, most degrading of her life and she now suffers from serious
depression.90
After giving birth to a nearly ten-pound child while shackled,
Shawanna Nelson endured various severe injuries and now suffers
from extreme mental distress.91 During the night after giving birth and
being separated from her newborn child, Ms. Nelson needed to relieve
85
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herself in the restroom.92 However, the restriction of the shackles in
addition to the injuries she sustained during her shackled birth severely
limited her mobility.93 Thus, Ms. Nelson was unable to wait to use the
restroom before the accompanying officer unlocked her shackles, and
was forced to soil herself.94 In Ms. Nelson’s statement in the prison
grievance system, she described her experience by stating:
I am traumatized by this event, my hip is still very sore,
and I can only sleep on my back. It is not a day that
goes by that I don’t wonder why I was treated that way.
[Officer] Turensky had a gun so, why was I restrained?
. . . . It is enough to be separated from a newborn baby,
but to be treated like an animal while giving birth
totally ruins your whole mental and emotional state of
mind.95
VII.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

A. Shackling Constitutes an Unconstitutional Violation of
the Eighth Amendment
“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution.”96 In contrast, inmates
maintain their constitutional rights while incarcerated: “Admittedly,
prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate.”97
While lawful incarceration may bring about necessary limitations of
privileges and rights, such limitations may only be imposed for a
legitimate penological interest. No such interest justifies the alienation
of a prisoner from her rights to be spared from cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.98 In order to
assert an Eighth Amendment violation, “the offending conduct must be
wanton.”99 The word wanton is not strictly defined, and its meaning in
the Eighth Amendment context depends upon the circumstances in
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which the alleged violation occurs.100 However, the history of the
constitutional prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” has been
recounted at length in Supreme Court opinions, and sheds light on the
primary concerns of the drafters.
The phrase “cruel and unusual” first appeared in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, and appears to have been directed against
punishments unauthorized by statute, beyond the jurisdiction of the
court, or disproportionate to the offense involved.101 However, it
appears that when the American drafters adopted the phrase for
incorporation into the United States Constitution, they were primarily
concerned with the prohibition of tortures and other barbarous
methods of punishment.102
The Supreme Court, accordingly, first applied the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibitions to cases involving challenged methods of
execution. However, the Court has since expanded its interpretation,
holding that the Eighth Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”103
“The Court early recognized that ‘a principle to be vital, must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.’”104
“Thus the Clause forbidding ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments ‘is not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’”105 Thus, the Court has
more recently established precedent that the Eighth Amendment
proscribes treatment incompatible with “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”106
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court relied on the fundamental
principles above in establishing a constitutionally guaranteed level of
medical care for prison inmates.107 The Court held that the
government has an obligation to provide medical care for those whom
it is punishing by incarceration.108
Furthermore, deliberate
indifference by prison personnel to an inmate’s medical needs
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contravening the Eighth
Amendment.109 The Court explained that while incarcerated, an
100
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inmate is completely dependent and at the mercy of prison authorities
to properly handle his or her medical needs.110 In the worst cases,
failure to do may produce conditions of physical torture and even
impending death.111 In even the best cases, failure to do so may result
in pain and suffering that no one can argue is justified by any
legitimate penological purpose.112 “The infliction of such unnecessary
suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency . . .
.”113
In even more recent cases, the Court has further extended the
rationale of its holding in Estelle v. Gamble, holding that prison
officials have the additional obligation to ensure humane conditions
for inmates at all times of incarceration, and to protect prisoners in
custody from any substantial risks of harm to their health or safety.114
In Helling v. McKinney, for example, a prisoner brought a cause of
action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that prison officials
had, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of
environmental tobacco smoke that posed an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his future health.115 The Court held for the prisoner,
concluding that Eighth Amendment protection against deliberate
indifference to prison health problems extends to conditions that
threaten to cause health problems in the future, as well as current
health risks.116 In Hope v. Pelzer, an inmate filed suit after he was
handcuffed to a hitching post by prison guards.117 Hope, the inmate,
had gotten into an argument with a prison guard after he was caught
napping on the bus ride to a worksite.118 Hope was subsequently
handcuffed and transported back to the prison, where he was then
handcuffed to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun.119 The Court
held that Hope had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment because the guards had knowingly
subjected him to “a substantial risk of physical harm, unnecessary
pain, unnecessary exposure to the sun, prolonged thirst and taunting,
and a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular
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discomfort and humiliation.”120 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens noted that, “the Eighth Amendment violation is obvious.”121
It is no stretch to conclude that the act of shackling a pregnant
prison inmate, especially during labor, childbirth, or the post-partum
recovery process, constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment as
provided by Estelle v. Gamble. This is especially apparent in light of
Helling v. McKinney and Hope v. Pelzer. By shackling a pregnant
prison inmate, a prison official is knowingly subjecting the inmate to
grossly inhumane conditions, a substantial risk of harm to both the
health and safety of the inmate and her child, unnecessary pain and
suffering, and significant humiliation and discomfort. In the words of
Justice Stevens in Hope v. Pelzer, the Eighth Amendment violation in
cases involving the shackling of pregnant female inmates is obvious.
B. No Reasonable Penological Interest Justifies Shackling
Pregnant Female Inmates
Not only does the act of shackling exhibit a deliberate
indifference to a pregnant prisoner’s medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, but also there exists no
competing penological interest to justify such barbaric treatment. Still,
however, those resistant to banning the practice cite security interests,
safety needs, and decreasing flight risks as justifications.
In Turner v. Safley, the Court held that prison standards, such
as shackling, are subject to a “reasonableness” standard of review.
The Court explained, “When a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.”122 An analysis using the Court’s
framework in Turner v. Safley invalidates the claim that shackling is
reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes.
The relevant four-part test provided by the Court in Turner v.
Safley examines “whether a prison regulation that burdens
fundamental rights is ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological
objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those
concerns.”123 First, there must be a “valid, rational connection”
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest
put forward to justify it.124 Thus, a regulation cannot be sustained
where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted
120
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goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.125
Moreover, the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral
one.126
Second, whether there are alternative means of exercising the
right that remain open to prison inmates must be considered.127 Where
“other avenues” remain available for the exercise of the asserted right,
courts should be particularly conscious of the “measure of judicial
deference owed to corrections officials ... in gauging the validity of the
regulation.”128
Third, an analysis of “the impact accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and
on the allocation of prison resources generally” is required.129 The
Court in Turner v. Safley explained, “In the necessarily closed
environment of the correctional institution, few changes will have no
ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of the prison's
limited resources for preserving institutional order.”130 Further,
“[w]hen accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant
‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be
particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections
officials.”131
Finally, the fourth factor involves consideration of the
existence of alternatives. The Court noted that the “absence of ready
alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison
regulation,”132 while “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may
be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an
‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”133 However, the Court
warned:
This is not a “least restrictive alternative” test: prison
officials do not have to set up and then shoot down
every
conceivable
alternative
method
of
accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint.
But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative
that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de
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minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may
consider that as evidence that the regulation does not
satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.134
The prison policy of shackling pregnant female inmates fails
the Turner v. Safley test. First, there exists no “valid, rational
connection” between the prison regulation of shackling and any
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. Security
maintenance and flight risk are cited as the two principal justifications
for shackling. While these justifications may serve as legitimate
governmental interests when applied to the prototypical violent male
offenders that shackling was originally adopted to control, these
justifications are completely illogical when applied to pregnant female
inmates. The majority of female inmates are non-violent offenders,
and thus pose no security risk in the first place. Further, it is irrational
to conclude that a pregnant inmate, especially one in the active labor
process or one recovering from having just given birth, poses any
significant threat in terms of security or flight. In the unimaginable
case where such a pregnant inmate does attempt to escape, it seems
far-fetched that she would be able to travel very far before being
stopped.
As William Schultz, executive director of Amnesty
International succinctly stated, “this is the perfect example of rulefollowing at the expense of common sense. . . . [I]t’s almost as stupid
as shackling someone in a coma.”135 Thus, shackling cannot be
sustained as a reasonable regulation when imposed upon pregnant
female inmates, as the logical connection between the regulation and
the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational.136
The second part of the Turner v. Safley test, which requires
contemplation of “whether there are alternative means of exercising
the right that remain open to prison inmates”137 illustrates the
unconstitutionality of shackling female prison inmates because there
simply are no other alternative means offered to alleviate pregnant
female inmates from giving birth while being forced to endure the
barbaric and torturous practice of shackling. The lack of “other
avenues” available clearly demonstrates a gross and unjustified

134

Id. at 90-91.
Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2006, at A16.
136
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
137
Id. at 90.
135

130

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol. 3:2

deference toward prison officials and, consequently, the invalidity of
such a regulation.138
Third, “the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally” must be considered.139 The
Court in Turner v. Safley explained, “In the necessarily closed
environment of the correctional institution, few changes will have no
ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of the prison's
limited resources for preserving institutional order.”140 However, the
shackling of pregnant female inmates is, in fact, the perfect example of
a regulation that, if abolished, will have “no ramifications on the
liberty of others or on the use of the prison’s limited resources for
preserving institutional order.”141 The only ramification of abolishing
the shackling of pregnant female inmate is the positive ramification of
allowing her to serve her sentence without being exposed to cruel,
inhumane, and dangerous treatment.
Lastly, the Court’s declaration that “absence of ready
alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation”
must be considered.142 The Court noted that “the existence of obvious,
easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable,
but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”143 This is exactly
the case here. Various alternatives exist to shackling pregnant female
inmates. For example, states could elect to merely supervise pregnant
female inmates rather than shackle them. As stated previously, it is
irrational for a state to consider a pregnant inmate a security or flight
risk, especially if that inmate is in labor, giving birth, or recovering
from giving birth. Further, even if a woman has a history of violence
(which few female inmates have), or has ever attempted to escape
before (which few female inmates have), the likelihood that
supervision would not completely prevent a security breach or
immediately remedy it is nominal at best.
It is clear, applying the test in Turner v. Safley, that shackling
pregnant female inmates constitutes an invalid and unconstitutional
prison regulation, as it fails to be even remotely related to legitimate
penological interests.144
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INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Although international human rights law is not binding on the
United States courts, it does act as persuasive authority. This is
particularly important in the specific arena of shackling for two
reasons. First, there is evidence that the United States Supreme Court
has, within the past decade, given more acknowledgment and
consideration to international consensus, especially in consideration of
human rights issues.145 Second, this attention is especially valuable,
because if the United States does turn to the international arena for
guidance on the issue of shackling, it will be met with unwavering,
consistent outrage and criticism voiced by international committees,
health experts, and legislatures urging the United States to
immediately ban all shackling of pregnant inmates.
A. Increasing Acknowledgment of International Law and
Consensus
The United States Supreme Court has just recently started to
both refer to and rely upon international human rights law. This
encouraging shift was first illustrated in 2003 through the Court’s
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.146 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
held that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional,
as applied to adult males who had engaged in consensual acts of
sodomy in the privacy of their home.147 The Court explained that the
statute constituted a violation of the petitioners’ right to privacy,
impinging on their exercise of liberty interests protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.148
This case was of particular importance for two reasons. First,
the Court overruled its previous holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, in
which the Court steadfastly upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing
consensual sodomy.149 In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court refrained
from giving much consideration to homosexuality from a human rights
standpoint, and firmly invalidated the issue as unrelated to any
fundamental right.150 The Court was “quite unwilling” to confer upon
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homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy, insisting that
none of the rights announced in the Court’s prior cases dealing with
family relationships, marriage, or procreation bear any resemblance to
the asserted right to engage in sodomy.151 Further, the Court harshly
concluded that “to claim that a right to engage in [homosexual]
conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’ or
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”152
Thus, by overruling its holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court
illustrated significant progress in its consideration and
acknowledgement of the progression of human rights issues, and
necessary adaptation.
Even more importantly, the Court’s holding in Lawrence v.
Texas is significant due to the Court’s reference to and reliance upon
international human rights law and opinion in its decision. While
outlining its justifications and considerations for overturning its
previous ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court referred to the
parallel holding of the European Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, in which the European Court of Human Rights
struck down a Northern Ireland law that prohibited consensual
homosexual conduct.153 The Court explained, “To the extent Bowers
relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted
that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed not
Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v [sic] United Kingdom.”154
The Court continued:
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults
to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. The right
the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.
There has been no showing that in this country the
governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice
is somehow more legitimate or urgent.155
A second illustration of the United States Supreme Court’s
encouraging recognition and reliance upon international consensus and
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human rights law came in Roper v. Simmons,156 decided in 2005. The
Court in Roper v. Simmons held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit execution of individuals who were under 18
years of age at time of their capital crimes.157 Like the holding in
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court’s holding in Roper v. Simmons is
important for two reasons.
First, by holding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment forbids the imposition of the death
penalty upon offenders who were juveniles at the time of the crime’s
commission, the Court abrogated its previous ruling in Stanford v.
Kentucky, which is illustrative of progress. In Stanford v. Kentucky,
the Court held that imposition of capital punishment on an individual
for a crime committed at 16 or 17 years of age did not violate evolving
standards of decency and thus did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.158 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia declined to take international consensus into
consideration, and focused his analysis solely on the Constitution and
precedent of United States courts.159 Justice Brennan, however, with
whom Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens joined,
pointed to persuasive international law and opinion in his dissent.
Justice Brennan insisted that although the majority seemed determined
to root its holding in constitutional grounds, “indicators of
contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other
countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis.”160
Justice Brennan explained:
Many countries, of course – over 50, including nearly
all in Western Europe – have formally abolished the
death penalty, or have limited its use to exceptional
crimes such as treason. Twenty-seven others do not in
practice impose the penalty. Of the nations that retain
capital punishment, a majority – 65 – prohibit the
execution of juveniles. Sixty-one countries retain
capital punishment and have no statutory provision
exempting juveniles, though some of these nations are
ratifiers of international treaties that do prohibit the
execution of juveniles.
Since 1979, Amnesty
International has recorded only eight executions of
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offenders under 18 throughout the world, three of these
in the United States. The other five executions were
carried out in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and
Barbados. In addition to national laws, three leading
human rights treaties ratified or signed by the United
States explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.
Within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be
overwhelmingly disapproved.161
Although the dissent did not have an effect on the holding of Stanford
v. Kentucky in 1989, it most certainly grabbed some attention, and
possibly influenced Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper v.
Simmons in 2005.
Accordingly, the second reason that Roper v. Simmons is
significant in that, unlike in Stanford v. Kentucky, the majority relied
heavily upon international consensus in its holding, thus securing
international human rights law’s credibility in the United States
Supreme Court’s decision-making process. In its opinion, the Court
took notice of “the stark reality that the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty.”162 Justice Kennedy explained:
[O]nly seven countries other than the United States
have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. Since then
each of these countries has either abolished capital
punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of
the practice. In sum, it is fair to say that the United
States now stands alone in a world that has turned its
face against the juvenile death penalty.163
Further, the Court explained:
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming
weight of international opinion against the juvenile
death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding
that the instability and emotional imbalance of young
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people may often be a factor in the crime. The opinion
of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions.164
The Court’s decisions and consideration in both Lawrence v.
Texas and Roper v. Simmons are encouraging, as they illustrate the
Supreme Court’s increasing acknowledgment of international human
rights law and international consensus as persuasive authority. This
shift is especially valuable in regards to the shackling epidemic in the
United States, because if the United States does turn to the
international arena for guidance on the issue of shackling, it will find
unwavering, consistent support for the abolishment of the barbaric
practice.
B. International Opposition
In addition to constituting a violation of the United States
Constitution, the shackling of pregnant female inmates is also a clear
violation of various international human rights laws and conventions,
which afford broad protections to pregnant women. Most specifically,
the United States’ shackling of pregnant female inmates violates two
major international treaties: the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment165 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,166 both of which
are ratified by the United States.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, also known as CAT, was
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December
10, 1984.167 The Convention entered into force on June 26, 1987, and
has been ratified by 151 nations, including the United States, which
ratified the treaty in 1994.168 Thus, it is both ironic and concerning
that the United State continues to employ the practice of shackling
164
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pregnant female inmates, as CAT implicitly prohibits such action. In
Article I, Section I of CAT provides:
“[T]orture” means any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It
does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.169
Furthermore, Article 16 of CAT provides that actions which fall short
of torture may still constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment,170 thus providing a catch-all provision. The United Nations
Committee Against Torture serves as the monitoring body of CAT.171
The Committee is a United Nations body of ten independent experts
that meets twice per year in Geneva, Switzerland to monitor the
implementation of CAT and review State compliance.172
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, known as ICCPR, was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on December 16, 1966, and entered into force on March 23,
1976.173 ICCPR currently has 74 signatories and 167 parties,
including the United States, which ratified the treaty in 1992.174
ICCPR has five core provisions, outlining individual rights to physical
integrity, liberty and security of person, procedural fairness and rights
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of the accused, individual liberties, and political rights.175 The United
Nations Human Rights Committee serves as the monitoring body of
ICCPR.176 The United Nations Human Rights Committee is a United
Nations body of eighteen independent experts that meets
approximately three times per year in Geneva, Switzerland or New
York to review compliance of member states with ICCPR.177 The
members of the Committee, who must be of high moral character and
recognized competence in the field of human rights, are elected by the
member states on an individual basis.178
Since 2000, various complaints have been submitted to both
governing Committees, drawing attention to the United States’
violations of the two treaties through the practice of shackling
pregnant female inmates. Two reports stand out in significance. In
May of 2000, Amnesty International filed a complaint with the United
Nations Committee against Torture, reporting that in the United States,
it “remains common for restraints to be used on pregnant women
prisoners when they are transported to and kept at the hospital,
regardless of their security status.”179 The report led to international
condemnation of the practice, and criticism of the United States for
their violation of the treaty.180 The United Nations Committee Against
Torture expressly stated, “The Committee is concerned at the
treatment of detained women in the State party, including genderbased humiliation and incidents of shackling women detainees during
childbirth” as prohibited by Article 16.181 The Committee continued,
“The State party should adopt all appropriate measures to ensure that
women in detention are treated in conformity with international
standards.”182 The Human Rights Committee issued concluding
observations directed at the United States, reiterating its position that
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the United States should immediately “prohibit the shackling of
detained women during childbirth” in order to reach compliance with
the treaty and international human rights laws.183
The United States was again on the receiving end of harsh
criticism after another complaint was filed in 2006. This time, the
complaint was filed by the International Gender Organization.184 The
United Nations Committee Against Torture was more specific in its
address, dedicating an entire section to its concerns regarding the
United States’ shackling of pregnant inmates during childbirth.185 The
Committee explained, “The Committee is concerned at the treatment
of detailed women in the State part, including gender-based
humiliation and incidents of shackling women detainees during
childbirth” in violation of Article 16.186 “The State part should adopt
all appropriate measures to ensure that women in detention are treated
in conformity with international standards.”187
As evidenced above, the United States is violating women’s
rights on an international scale by shackling incarcerated pregnant
women, and is being repeatedly called out for its barbaric actions by
numerous international authorities and experts. The United States
must immediately abolish the practice in order to comply with its
obligations under various human rights treaties.
IX.

PROMISING PROGRESS

Over the past decade, human rights advocates have achieved
significant headway in drawing attention to the issue of shackling
pregnant female inmates and initiating policy change at the federal and
state levels. Amnesty International’s report in 2000 constituted the
first of its kind, publically bringing the United States under fire for its
barbaric, but disturbingly common practice of shackling pregnant
female inmates.188 Amnesty International’s report essentially opened
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the door for what has now become consistent condemnation, being the
very first to avoid tip-toeing around the issue, demanding immediate
resolution, and declaring the United States’ actions “a direct violation
of international standards.”189
This report has led to anti-shackling laws in numerous states.
Illinois, California, Vermont, and Rhode Island have all passed antishackling legislation. In 2000, the Illinois state legislature amended
the state’s Unified Code of Corrections by adding an anti-shackling
provision.190 The provision expressly states:
Pregnant female committed persons. Notwithstanding
any other statute, directive, or administrative regulation,
when a pregnant female committed person is brought to
a hospital from an Illinois correctional center for the
purpose of delivering her baby, no handcuffs, shackles,
or restraints of any kind may be used during her
transport to a medical facility for the purpose of
delivering her baby. Under no circumstances may leg
irons or shackles or waist shackles be used on any
pregnant female committed person who is in labor.
Upon the pregnant female committed person's entry to
the hospital delivery room, a correctional officer must
be posted immediately outside the delivery room. The
Department must provide for adequate personnel to
monitor the pregnant female committed person during
her transport to and from the hospital and during her
stay at the hospital.191
In 2005, California followed in Illinois’ footsteps by enacting
an anti-shackling provision. California’s provision, outlined in a fivepart provision of the Penal Code, succinctly provides, “An inmate
known to be pregnant or in recovery after delivery shall not be
restrained by the use of leg irons, waist chains, or handcuffs behind the
body.”192
A few state legislatures have implemented shackling
provisions, but fall short of calling for the complete abolishment of the
practice upon pregnant female inmates. For example, in 2012, Rhode
Island’s legislature implemented an extensive five-part provision in its
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Administrative Code. The provision prohibits the use of leg or waist
restraints on an inmate during labor and delivery by providing, “Under
no circumstances can leg or waist restraints be used on any detainee or
inmate during labor and delivery.”193 However, handcuffs are
permitted as restraining mechanisms during labor and delivery, and leg
and waist restraints are permitted both prior to labor and after the birth
of the child if the inmate poses “(1) [a]n immediate and serious threat
of physical harm to herself, staff or others; or (2) [a] substantial flight
risk and cannot be reasonably contained by other means.”194
Progress has also been achieved in United States Circuit
Courts. In Shawanna Nelson’s case, Nelson v. Correctional Medical
Services, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit made history when it became the first appellate court to finally
hold that shackling a female inmate during the labor and delivery
processes, in the absence of clear and individualized safety and
security justifications, constitutes a violation of one’s “clearly
established” Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.195 The en banc United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit “determined that there is sufficient evidence in the
record to permit a reasonable fact-finder to determine that Turensky's
actions [in shackling Nelson] violated the Eighth Amendment . . . .”196
Additionally, Juana Villegas’ case, Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville, continues to be litigated in the Sixth Circuit with
encouraging progress.197 In April of 2011, a United States District
Court granted summary judgment to Ms. Villegas, leading a jury to
award her $200,000 in damages after a trial.198 In March of 2013,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the District Court’s ruling and remanded the case back for
further proceedings due to the existence of material questions of
fact.199
Despite the noted progress above, these achievements and the
extraordinary efforts of activists and attorneys unfortunately still fail to
keep pace with the exorbitant rate at which females are entering the
United States’ criminal justice system, and thus the number of
incarcerated pregnant women forced to endure shackling continues to
grow.
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CONCLUSION

In failing to immediately implement federal legislation banning
the shackling of pregnant female inmates, the United States is allowing
a practice to continue that is not only dangerous, barbaric, and
inhumane, but also constitutes a violation of the United States
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, as well as international human
rights laws and treaties. No penological interests can be classified as
legitimate justifications for the continued shackling of these female
prisoners, especially in light of the excessive medical dangers that
shackling imposes upon both the mother and her child. Although
advocates and some state legislatures have achieved encouraging
progress, these efforts are not enough, and the United States remains
an outlier in its cruel practices. The United States needs to follow the
advice and recommendations of its international allies, and abandon
the grossly inhumane practice of shackling pregnant female inmates.
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